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Threatening an "Irrational" Breach of Contract
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar*
When circumstances surrounding the contract change, a
party might consider breach a more attractive option than
performance. Threatening breach, this party may induce the
other party to modify the original agreement. The contract
law doctrine of modification determines whether and when
these modifications are enforceable. To promote social wel-
fare as well as the interests of the threatened party, the law
should enforce modifications if and only if the modification
demand is backed by a credible threat to breach. This paper
argues that credibility is not a function of pecuniary interests
alone. A decision to breach can be motivated also by senti-
ments towards the fairness of the division of the surplus be-
tween the parties. A party whose share in the surplus is re-
duced in an unexpected fashion might have a credible threat
to breach, even if his absolute payoff from performance is still
positive and greater than his payoff from breach. The paper
explores the patterns by which such fairness concerns arise.
Recognizing the prevalence of these concerns suggests that
modifications should be enforced in a larger set of circum-
stances than previously perceived. Lastly, the paper offers a
fresh perspective on some of the landmark cases in the law of
modification and duress.
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A person who is known to "dislike" an unfair bargain can
credibly threaten to walk away from one, even when it is in
her narrow interest to accept it. By virtue of being known to
have this preference she becomes a more effective negotia-
tor.-Robert H. Frank. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
When circumstances surrounding the contract change, a party might
consider breach a more attractive option than performance. His in-
centive to breach, often manifested by an explicit modification de-
mand backed by a threat to cease performance, may convince the
other party to modify the original agreement. The contract law doc-
trine of modification determines whether and when these modifica-
tions, reached under explicit threats to breach, are enforceable.
It has been recognized, by courts and scholars, that one of the fac-
tors that should affect the decision to enforce the modification is the
"reasonableness" of the threat to breach. If the new circumstances
are such that performance under the original terms would come to
involve a loss for one party, his demand for better terms is viewed
more favorably, and the resulting modification is more likely to be en-
forced.2 This reasonableness-of-threat test is not, however, the only-
or even the main-criterion for enforcing modification agreements.
A second test is often applied, focusing instead on the perspective of
the threatened party, examining whether her acquiescence to the
modified terms was extracted in a coercive manner. Under this test,
it matters whether the threatened party had reasonable alternatives
or adequate resort to remedies. If she had not, the modification
agreement is deemed coercive and is governed under the doctrine of
"duress," rendering it voidable. 3
The two tests-one focusing on the motivation of the threatening
party and the other on the alternatives available to the threatened
party-may be in conflict. It is not uncommon for a modification
demand/threat to be motivated by unanticipated losses, and neverthe-
IRobert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions, 5
(Norton, 1988).
2 UCC §2-209, cmt. 2.
3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1981) ("If a party's manifestation of as-
sent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no rea-
sonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim"). Id. at cmt. b, Ill. 5 stating:
'A, who has contracted to sell goods to B, makes an improper threat to refuse to deliver
the goods to B unless B modifies the contract to increase the price. B attempts to buy
substitute goods elsewhere but is unable to do so. Being in urgent need of the goods, he
makes the modification.[. . .] B has no reasonable alternative, A's threat amounts to
duress, and the modification is voidable by B:'
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less leave the threatened party no choice but to concede. When these
conflicts arise, the duress perspective is often the primary one en-
dorsed by courts, rendering the modification unenforceable. 4 We have
argued elsewhere against this hierarchy among the normative crite-
ria. We demonstrated that enforcement of modifications should turn
on one, and only one, factor: whether the threat to breach, which led
to the modification, was credible.5 In this paper, we turn to examine
more systematically the factors that can render the threat to breach
credible. In doing so, we hope to complement our previous work with
a more robust descriptive account of the bargaining environment.
Accordingly, the analysis in this paper addresses the contract mod-
ification problem from the perspective of the threatening party. It ex-
amines the credibility of his modification threat, namely, his motiva-
tion to breach the original contract in case his modification demand
is turned down.
Economic analysis provides a standard tool to evaluate the issue of
threat credibility. It assesses the payoff to the threatening party from
carrying out the threat, which usually equals his breach liability, and
compares it to his payoff from retracting the threat and performing the
agreement under the original terms. It is only when the pecuniary loss
from performance exceeds the pecuniary cost of breach that the threat
is deemed credible. Otherwise, the threat to breach is "cheap talk," as
game theorists would put it, or a "bluff," and may well be disregarded.
This paper develops an additional perspective to supplement the
standard economic account of the credibility of threats to breach.
This perspective suggests that the breach-or-perform decision can be
motivated by factors that are not captured by standard pecuniary cal-
culus. In particular, the decision can be motivated by sentiments to-
wards the fairness of the division of the surplus between the parties.
A party whose share in the surplus is reduced in a manner that vio-
lates his notions of fairness may have a credible threat to breach, even
if his absolute payoff from performance is still positive and greater
than his payoff from breach.
Building on previous literature that identified the general preva-
lence of "fairness" sentiments in economic decisions, the paper ex-
4 Arthur Linton Corbin, 7 Corbin on Contracts §28.6 (West, 1964); E. Allan
Farnsworth, 1 Contracts 282 (Little Brown, 3rd ed 1999) ("In fashioning a solution to
the problem of the enforceability of modifications, the drafters of the Code discarded
the trappings of the doctrine of consideration to bare the real abuse of the bargaining
process-coercion. The result is remarkably consistent with the liberalized rules on
duress.")
5 Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Credibility of Threats to Breach, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 2002-017, John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics, University
of Michigan Law School (2002).
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plores the patterns by which such fairness concerns affect the credi-
bility of threats to breach existing contracts. It demonstrates that the
threat to breach can be credible while "irrational": the threatening
party may carry it out even if doing so, and bearing liability for breach,
is more costly than performance under the original terms.6 The paper
then studies the normative implications of this descriptive insight. It
shows that, in order to protect the interests of the threatened party,
modifications ought to be enforceable in a larger set of circumstances
than previously perceived.
To illustrate, consider a seller who experiences an unexpected in-
crease in his cost of performance (due to forces outside the seller's
control). Assume that the increased cost is such that the seller would
suffer a small net loss if he performs the contract, but would suffer a
greater loss if he breaches and is ordered to pay damages. The seller
demands a modification-one that would allow the seller to cover his
cost, but would still leave the buyer with a positive profit. Imagine
that the buyer refuses to modify the contract, requiring the seller to
bear the entire burden of the unanticipated cost increase. Traditional
notions of credibility suggest that if the buyer refuses to modify the
contract the seller would simply perform it. The seller is better off
bearing the cost increase than liability for breach. However, the seller
may also deem performance under the original terms to be unfair. It
provides him with a smaller share of the ex post surplus than he
"deserves," violating his desire to be treated fairly by his opponent,
stirring sentiments of anger, insult, and the like. Such sentiments
provide an additional reason for the seller to prefer breach to perfor-
mance under the original terms. If these fairness concerns are suffi-
ciently strong, they can render the seller's seemingly noncredible
threat to breach sufficiently credible to be taken seriously. It might
be in the interest of the buyer to acquiesce to such a threat and con-
cede better terms to the seller, thereby avoiding the risk of stirring a
hostile action on the part of the seller. The only way the buyer can
make such a commitment and avoid breach is by making an enforce-
able modification.
The analysis in this paper is organized as follows. Section II begins
with a brief introduction to the law of contract modification. Section
III describes the "credibility principle," namely, the idea that en-
forcement of modifications should turn solely on the issue of the
6 Throughout the discussion we do not take a position on the question whether
emotional responses, such as anger and insult, are necessarily in conflict with the pre-
dictions of rational choice theory. For recent contributions to this debate, see e.g. Ken
Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume II: Just Playing338-343 (MIT
1998); Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue 133 (Viking Penguin, 1997).
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credibility of the threat to breach. Section IV is the core of the paper.
It develops a model of decision making motivated (in part) by fairness
concerns. It distinguishes several sources of fairness sentiments, and
identifies their effect on the credibility of the threat to breach. Section
V then derives the normative implications for modification doctrine
and applies these lessons to some leading cases. Section VI concludes.
II. THE LAW OF CONTRACT MODIFICATION
The law of contract modification has long outgrown its early premise
that modifications are promises lacking consideration and thus un-
enforceable.7 In the old days, this premise forced courts to recite two
false observations. First, it was commonly stated that the acquiescing
party-usually a creditor who is asked to waive some of the debt-is
receiving nothing in return for his acquiescence. "Payment of a lesser
sum on the day cannot be a satisfaction of a greater sum" was the in-
structive statement by Lord Coke in Pinnel's Case.8 Even in follow-
ing this directive, courts acknowledged its fallacy: "it may be much
more advantageous to the creditor to obtain immediate payment of
part of his debt than to wait to enforce payment."9 Accordingly, courts
have invented an "offsetting" fiction, also evidently false, that mod-
ification involves consideration in the form of rescission of the orig-
inal contract. '0
The notion that a modifications fate ought to be determined by the
doctrine of consideration has been reformed, both judicially and leg-
islatively." Instead, courts are instructed to verify that the modifi-
cation demand was made in good faith, and that it was "fair and
equitable" in view of the changed circumstances. These instructions
direct courts to examine the perspectives of both parties. They have to
look at the reasons why a party made the modification demand in the
first place, namely, were there "reasonable commercial reasons" such
as "a market shift which makes performance come to involve a loss."12
But courts also look at the position of the other party, whether her
surrender to the modification demand exhibits coercion and duress.13
7 Samuel Williston, 3 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 7:36 (Lawyers Coopera-
tive Publishing, 4th ed 1992).
8 77 Eng Rep 237 (CP 1602).
9 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App Cas 605 (1884).
10 See, e.g., Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 131 NE 887 (NY 1921).
11 Restatement § 89 (cited in note 3); UCC §2-209 (1) ('An Agreement modifying a
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding").12 UCC §2-209, Cmt. 2.
13 See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 NE2d 533 (NY 1971).
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Much of the modification jurisprudence has focused on the issue
of duress. Both the Restatement and the Code agree that if duress was
present, the modified agreement is voidable.' 4 And both Code and
common law court decisions tend to find duress whenever the threat-
ened party has no effective resort to remedies or to substitute deals
and must surrender to the threat. 15 While there is occasional adher-
ence to the idea that the enforceability of modification should turn
on the issue of the credibility of the threat to breach,16 court decisions
have by and large conformed to the duress principle. 7
Lastly, in those cases that do apply the credibility principle, namely,
enforce a modification only if the modification demand was reason-
able or credible, the main factor that courts investigate is whether the
original contract came to involve a loss. In such circumstances, where
the party suffering a pecuniary loss is likely to breach rather than per-
form under the original terms, some courts have reasoned that in the
absence of a modification breach would likely occur, to the detriment
of both parties.' Still, even in these cases, in evaluating the credibil-
ity of the modification demand courts have looked strictly at the pe-
cuniary comparison between the cost of performance under the orig-
inal terms and the cost of breach.
It is fair to say, then, that the law of contract modification has gen-
erally been subsumed by the doctrine of duress. What determines if a
modification is enforceable is the threatened party's free assent. 19
In the next section, we examine the desirability of this approach. We
develop the "credibility principle," which suggests that the threat-
ened party's free assent should not be the determining issue. Instead,
the sole enforceability criterion should be the credibility of the threat
to breach.
14 See, e.g., Marvin Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Con-
tracts 69 (Foundation, 4th ed 2001).
'1 Austin, 272 NE2d at 535 (duress exists only when "the threatened party could
not obtain the goods from another source of supply and the ordinary remedy of an ac-
tion for breach of contract would not be adequate").
16 Gobel v. Linn, 11 N.W 284 (Mich 1882); Angel v. Murray, 322 A2d 630 (RI 1974).
17 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts at 57 (cited in note 4). 'A modification coerced by a
wrongful threat to breach under circumstances in which the coerced party has no rea-
sonable alternative should prima facie be voidable .... In such circumstances, it
should be immaterial that the party exercising coercion has a good business reason
for its wrongful demands." Id. (emphasis added).
18 See, e.g., Jaffray v. Greenbaum, 20 NW 775, 778 (Ia 1884). High rent originally
agreed upon may be less valuable to the landlord than the modified lower rent, which
guarantees that the tenant should remain in business and in occupancy. Id.
19 Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith
and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L Rev 849, 880-84 ("the issue of free as-
sent is at the core").
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III. THE CREDIBILITY PRINCIPLE
A. Informal Analysis
When a party makes a demand for modification of a contract, backed
by a threat to breach if the demand is rejected, will the threatened
party acquiesce and accept less favorable terms? In analyzing this
question, we have to consider what will be the result of a rejection of
the modification demand.
For the threatened party to accommodate the modification de-
mand and surrender to less favorable terms, she must first perceive
the threat to breach to be credible (or that there is a positive proba-
bility that it is credible). If she deemed the threat to be a bluff, there
would be no cost for her in rejecting the threat: the threatening party
will not carry his threat out, but rather perform the contract under
the original agreed-upon terms. Thus, a necessary condition for mod-
ification to occur is the credibility of the threat to breach.
Credibility is a necessary but not sufficient, condition for modifica-
tion. Even if the threat is credible, the threatened party may prefer to
reject it. Since she already acquired a contractual right for performance
under the original terms, she expects that a rejection of the threat
would result in breach, which in turn would entitle her to expectation
damages. Thus, the threatened party compares the value of the rem-
edy to the value that she will be left with under a modified contract.
Note that when the threat to breach is credible, her choices no longer
include a third alternative, namely, the value of performance under
the original terms; the other party, having a credible threat to breach,
will not perform the contract under the original terms. Accordingly,
the threatened party's remaining choice is between performance un-
der the modified, less favorable, terms, and breach remedies.
20
For modification to occur, then, it is necessary that the threat to
breach would be credible, and that the threatened party would prefer
the modified terms to remedies for breach. Further, modification
will only be agreed upon if the parties can, at the renegotiation stage,
find terms that would make them both better off relative to non-
agreement and breach. One obvious case in which no such "bargain-
20 Many courts have taken the position that the threatened party should be entitled
to the value of the performed contract under the original, pre-modification, terms, and
have pursued this policy by refusing to enforce the conceded modification. However,
under this prevalent non-enforcement approach, the threatening party will realize that
any renegotiated concession he extracted is valueless, and will not bother offering the
modification. If he has a credible threat to breach, he will prefer to breach. In other
words, courts' perception that the pre-modification terms can be enforced is misguided.
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ing range" exists, is where performance came to involve costs ex-
ceeding its value (the case of "efficient breach"). But a bargaining
range may not exist at the renegotiation stage even if performance is
still efficient. If the burden of remedies on the breaching party is less
than the value of remedies to the breached-against party, such "bar-
gaining range" may not exist, and an inefficient breach-rather than
modification-would occur.
This analysis suggests that in order to understand (and predict)
when a modification would occur, we need to examine the motiva-
tions of both the threatening party and the threatened party. Accord-
ingly, it might be conjectured, in determining when a modification
should be enforced, courts would need to examine both parties' posi-
tions. In particular, courts would need to check whether the threat-
ening party had a credible threat to breach and whether the threat-
ened party had reasonable alternatives or adequate resort to remedies.
Indeed, this is what courts often do.2'
As we showed elsewhere,2 2 however, this conclusion is misguided.
In deciding whether to enforce a modification that was obtained by
threat to breach, the court should focus solely on the threatening
party's perspective, and enforce the modification any time the threat
that led to it was credible. In particular, the court should not focus on
the motivation of the threatened party. Whether this party had ade-
quate resort to remedies or not should have no bearing on the nor-
mative decision whether to enforce a modification.
The reason why enforcement should not turn on the issue of the
adequacy of remedies is the following. When the threatened party's
effective choice is between the modified terms and remedies for
breach, her acquiescence to the modification demand indicates that
she herself deemed remedies for breach to be inferior to the modified
terms. Otherwise, if remedies were deemed adequate, why would she
concede to the threat and accept less favorable terms? Thus, from the
perspective of the threatened party, her acquiescence indicates she
would unambiguously be better off if the modification were enforced
than having to settle for remedies. Put differently, if a court faces a
case in which a modification occurred, it must infer that the threat-
ened party deemed her remedies to be inadequate. Thus, there is no
reason to condition enforcement on the question of the adequacy of
remedies. This inadequacy-of-remedies test is equivalent to a regime
of non-enforcement of modifications.
Moreover, the tendency of courts to examine the threatened party's
21 Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts at §4.22 (cited in note 4).
22 See Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, The Credibility of Threats to Breach (cited in note 5).
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar 151
situation, and to invalidate the modification whenever it was ex-
tracted by duress, namely, whenever the threatened party had no rea-
sonable alternatives or adequate remedies, is harmful to the threat-
enedparty herself (even though she is the one who, ex post, is seeking
this invalidation). It means that she cannot make a credible commit-
ment ex ante to modify the original contract. In such situations, the
other party will not bother to extract a modification (anticipating
that they will be struck down anyway). That is, precisely in those
cases in which the threatened party would want to make a commit-
ment and avoid the outcome of breach, courts' reluctance to enforce
the modification makes this goal impossible to achieve.
This analysis suggests that the only factor that should bear on the
decision to enforce a modified contract is the credibility of the threat
that led to the modification. In particular, to the extent that the
threatened party may have difficulty distinguishing between credible
threats and bluffs, and may thus be unable to acquiesce "selectively,"
only to credible threats, courts can promote the optimal outcome by
inquiring into the credibility of the threat and enforcing modifica-
tions only when the threats that led to them were credible.
Once it is established that the sole relevant criterion for enforce-
ability of deals reached under a threat is the credibility of the threat,
it is worth exploring the various factors that bear on the issue of cred-
ibility. For example, it would be important to understand which cat-
egories of unanticipated cost increases are more likely to enhance the
credibility of the threat to breach. In addition, it would be important
to examine the modification jurisprudence and check the extent to
which court decisions conform to the credibility condition. We began
this exploration elsewhere. 3 However, in that work we restricted our
attention to factors that would affect the credibility of a rational
threatening party. We did not explore factors that might make an ir-
rational threat credible nevertheless. It is this direction that we pur-
sue in the current paper. We argue that a threat to breach can be cred-
ible even if it is against the pecuniary interest of the threatening party
to carry it out. However, before turning to the analysis of such "irra-
tional credibility" let us briefly restate the above discussion in more
formal terms, and thus develop a framework for the subsequent irra-
tionality analysis.
23 See Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, The Credibility of Threats to Breach at sections IV-
V (cited in note 5). There, we argue that much of the modification jurisprudence does
not conform to the credibility principle. We identified prominent examples where
modifications where voided even though the threats under which they were made were
credible. See, e.g., Kelsey-Hayes Co v. Galtaco Redlaw Casting Corp, 749 F Supp 794
(E D Mich 1990).
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B. Formal Analysis
Consider a seller (he) and a buyer (she) contracting over the sale of one
indivisible asset. The following timing summarizes the interaction.
At period 0 the two parties sign the original contract, specifying the
delivery of the asset by the seller to the buyer in exchange for a pay-
ment, p.24 The value of the asset to the buyer is v. The seller's cost of
creating the asset (or parting with the asset, namely the value of the
asset to the seller) is thought to be c, at this period.
Before period 1, an "unanticipated" change of circumstances might
increase the cost of performance for the seller from c to C > c. It is as-
sumed that performance is efficient, even with the higher price C,
namely v > C. While the seller observes the actual cost realization, c
or C, the buyer can only observe the distribution from which this cost
is drawn. For simplicity, assume that there is a probability t that the
seller's cost will be C > c, and a probability (1 - n) that the seller's cost
will remain c.
As a result of the cost increase, at period 1 the seller may demand
to renegotiate the contract price. It is assumed that if renegotiation is
successful, the parties agree on a new price, P > p. The conditions un-
der which such a modification will occur and the precise value of P
are analyzed below. Then, at period 2, the seller decides whether to
deliver the asset to the buyer, i.e. whether to perform or breach the
original or modified contract (depending on the success or failure of
the period 1 renegotiation).
Finally, at period 3, litigation may occur. If a modification was
agreed upon at period 1, the buyer may seek to invalidate it and the
seller may seek to enforce it. The court's decision will depend on the
legal rule of enforceability, and the analysis will consider possible le-
gal regimes. If, instead, a modification was not negotiated and the
seller breached, the buyer will seek damages for breach, d, and it is as-
sumed that she can secure a judgment for monetary damages equal to
her expectation loss, namely, d = v - p.
One begins by looking at the seller's incentive. If the seller's at-
tempt at modification fails, will he perform or breach the initial con-
tract? The seller's decision is based on a comparison between his per-
formance payoff and his breach payoff. If the seller performs, he nets
p - 6, where 6 e 1c, C). If he breaches, a court will ideally order him
24 This is clearly an incomplete contract. For similar accounts of contractual in-
completeness and subsequent renegotiation see, e.g., Milton Harris and Bengt Holm-
strom, On the Duration of Agreements, 28 Intl Econ Rev 389, 389-405 (1987); Ronald
A. Dye, Optimal Length of Labor Contracts, 26 Intl Econ Rev 251, 251-270 (1985); and
Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Quar J Econ 121,
121-148 (1984).
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to pay damages of d = v - p at period 3. Generally, however, the bur-
den imposed on the seller by these prospective damages is different
than d, and may be either higher or lower. Denote this burden by Ds .
Comparing the seller's performance payoff and breach payoff, follow-
ing a rejection by the buyer of the modification demand, the seller
will decide to breach if and only if
(1) 6-p>Ds
If condition (1) holds, the seller will decide to breach at period 3.
Otherwise, he will perform. When condition (1) is satisfied, the seller
has a credible threat to breach.25 Accordingly, we refer to condition
(1) as the "credibility condition." We assume that when 6 = c the cred-
ibility condition is not satisfied, but when the cost of performance
turns out to be unexpectedly high, i.e. when 6 = C, the credibility
condition may be satisfied and the seller may have a credible modifi-
cation demand.
Turn now to period 1, when the parties may renegotiate the original
contract. These renegotiations are influenced by the informational
asymmetry between the two parties. In particular, the buyer does not
observe the seller's actual performance cost, and therefore does not
know whether the seller has a credible modification demand. 26 How-
ever, the buyer knows how much she can recover if a breach occurs.
While the court will ideally award the buyer damages of d = v - p, the
actual value of the remedial right will generally be different from d. De-
note this value by D,. The buyer will refuse to negotiate any modifica-
tion and will resort to damages whenever D > v - p(= d). If, however,
D, < v - p, namely, if the buyer is inadequately protected by remedies,
she may agree to a new, higher price, P. What this price will be depends
on her bargaining power, the informational structure of the bargain-
ing, and the legal regime concerning enforceability of modifications.
In particular, it can be shown that if courts apply a selective en-
forcement regime, under which a modification is enforceable only
when the threat that led to it was credible, the buyer will concede a
price increase of ApE [C -p - Ds, v-p - D ],27 and a modification will
be demanded (and agreed upon) only when the seller has a credible
threat.2 8 It can also be shown that such a regime is superior, from the
buyer's perspective as well as from a social perspective to either,
an unconditional enforcement regime, a no-enforcement regime, or
25 Note that condition (1) implies D. < d.
26 Assume for now that C is sufficiently large so that C - p > Ds .
27 Depending on the parties' relative bargaining power. Note that there will be no
modification unless C - p - Ds < v - p - DB or v - C > D, - Ds .
28 See Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, The Credibility of Threats to Breach at Section III
(cited in note 5).
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a "duress" regime that conditions enforcement on the availability of
adequate remedies or substitutes.
29
IV. FAIRNESS
We have seen that a modification ought to be enforced any time it re-
sults from a credible threat to breach. The credibility of a seller's
threat to breach is determined by condition (1):
(1) 6-p>D,
We focus initially on the cost element in condition (1). Recall that ab-
sent an unanticipated change of circumstances the cost of perfor-
mance is c and condition (1) does not hold. Now, consider an unan-
ticipated event that raises the cost of performance to C, such that the
seller now faces a losing contract, i.e. C > p. Assume, however, that
this loss is still smaller than the cost of breach, i.e. C -p < D. From
a perfect rationality perspective, the seller does not have a credible
threat to breach.
By assumption, the cost of breach is greater than the material cost
of performance. But, the material cost may not be the only relevant
cost associated with performance. In particular, the seller might in-
cur a "fairness cost" when performing the contract. After all, why
should the seller bear the entire burden imposed by an unanticipated
cost increase, the occurrence of which was beyond his control? Why
should he lose from the transaction, while the buyer profits? More-
over, the transaction can be readily modified, by adjusting the con-
tract price, such that the seller's loss will be prevented, and still the
buyer will make a positive profit. Why not insist on such a modifica-
tion? Any other outcome would simply be unfair. Accordingly, we
turn to examine the patterns by which such notions of unfairness
would affect the seller's willingness to breach.
A. Preferences for Fairness
Recent experimental studies have reported that in important eco-
nomic settings individuals' behavior cannot be described solely on
the basis of the maximization of absolute monetary payoffs. In par-
ticular, fairness concerns have been shown to play a role in describ-
ing individuals' assessment of their well-being. Observed patterns of
decision-making appear, in these instances, to be at odds with the as-
sumption of maximization of absolute monetary payoff.
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In the labor market context, workers, when treated unfairly, often
react and respond by reducing the effort they invest. 30 Fairness con-
siderations have also been invoked to "explain why many employers
do not cut wages during periods of high unemployment despite the
potential offered by the supply/demand levels."31 The significant im-
pact of fairness concerns on behavior has been demonstrated in other
economic contexts as well. Arthur Okun observed that-
firms in the sports and entertainment industries offer their cus-
tomers tickets at standard prices for events that clearly generate
excess demand. Popular new models of automobiles may have
waiting lists that extend for months. Similarly, manufacturers
in a number of industries operate with backlogs in booms and
allocate shipments when they obviously could raise prices and
reduce the queue.
3 2
The failure of these markets to clear has been attributed to "the hos-
tile reaction of customers to price increases that are not justified by
increased costs and are therefore viewed as unfair."
33
Most relevant to the contract modification problem, fairness clearly
affects behavior in bargaining contexts.34 The most striking example
concerns the simplest form of bargaining, the take-it-or-leave-it offer,
also known as the ultimatum game. To give a concrete example, as-
sume that A and B must decide how to allocate $100 between them.
A proposes a certain allocation. B can either accept or reject A's pro-
30 See George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and
Unemployment, 105 Quar J Econ 255, 255-83 (1990).
31 See George A. Akerlof, The Case Against Conservative Macroeconomics: An In-
augural Lecture, 46 Economica 219, 219-37 (1979); Robert M. Solow, On Theories of Un-
employment, 70 Amer Econ Rev 1, 1-11 (1980); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and
Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J Bus 285, 285-300
(1986); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Amer Econ Rev 728, 728-41
(1986); Margaret A. Neale and Max H. Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in Negoti-
ation 158 (Free Press, 1991); Frank, Passions Within Reason at 177-78 (cited in note 1).
3- 2 Arthur Okun, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis 170 (Brookings
Institute, 1981).
33 Kahneman et al, 59 J Bus 285 (cited in note 31); Kahneman et al, 76 Amer Econ
Rev 728 (cited in note 31) (discussing Okun and providing additional examples). See
also Frank, Passions Within Reason at 174-177 (cited in note 1).
31 See generally Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Eco-
nomics, 83 Amer Econ Rev 1281, 1281-1302 (1993); Max H. Bazerman and Margaret A.
Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and Relationships in a Judgmental Per-
spective of Negotiation in Kenneth J. Arrow et al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution
ch 5 (Norton & Co, 1995); Steffen Huck and J6rg Oechssler, The Indirect Evolutionary
Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations, 28 Games & Econ Behav 13, 13-24 (1999).
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posal. If B accepts, the $100 are divided according to A's proposal. If B
rejects both parties get nothing. The perfect rationality game theo-
retic equilibrium in this game is straightforward. A offers an alloca-
tion, in which B gets a penny, and B accepts A's proposal, since a penny
is better than nothing. Any implicit or explicit threat by B to reject of-
fers that give her less than some larger share is not credible, will not
affect A's offer, and will not be carried out by B. This prediction, based
on the assumption of individual maximization of absolute monetary
payoffs, might be straightforward, but it is also patently unrealistic.
Robust empirical results demonstrate that responding parties in
one-shot ultimatum games consistently reject "unfair" offers even at
the expense of reducing their own payoffs significantly. And, conse-
quently, proposing parties offer "fair" allocations with substantial
sums awarded to the respondent.
3 5
One intuition explaining this result is that people would like to
be treated fairly and that this fairness concern may affect their be-
havior. As Richard Thayer puts it, when a party declines a positive
offer, "he signals that his utility function has non-monetary argu-
ments. (In English, this means he is insulted.) [He] says: 'I would
rather sacrifice I o than accept what I consider to be an unfair allo-
cation of the stake.' ' 36 Another way to view this phenomenon is as
one manifestation of an internalized social norm, usually applied in
repeated interactions, which prescribes retaliatory actions towards
selfish behavior.
37
Irrespective of their underpinning, fairness concerns clearly play a
role in describing individual behavior. To better understand this role,
we attempt to impose some structure onto these preferences for fair-
ness. In doing so we begin with the concept of a "fair outcome" in the
modification problem. We then develop a notion of an "unfairness
cost" that a seller bears when performing an unfair contract.
35 See, e.g., Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwartz, An Experimen-
tal Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J Econ Behav & Org 367 (1982); Kahneman et
al, 59 J Bus 285 (cited in note 31); Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums,
Dictators, and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp 209 (1995). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan L Rev 1471, 1489 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Be-
havioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 Calif L Rev 1051, 1051-1144 (2000). It should be noted that the experiments men-
tioned in the text were carefully designed to preclude any reputation effects by staging
the game as a one-shot interaction between strangers.
36 Richard Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life
23 (Princeton, 1992).
3 7 Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract at 343 (cited in note 6), and more
generally Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 64-82 (1990).
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B. What Is Fair? Identifying the Fair Outcome in the
Modification Context
The first step in incorporating fairness concerns into an individual's
preferences is the introduction of a concept of a "fair outcome." A
"fair outcome" or a concept of "fairness" is not an objective term.
The perception of "fairness" depends on the social environment (for
example on "what other people get") or on the history of the interac-
tion. Players do not necessarily agree on the concept of fairness as it
may depend on the role they play in the game. Consequently, fairness
is in the eye of the beholder.
38
Fairness concerns at the modification stage are triggered by the
unanticipated increase in the seller's cost of performance. But, the
cost of performance is not a uniform concept. Various changes can af-
fect different elements comprising the seller's cost of performance.
And, changes in different types of costs may have a different impact
on the relevant fairness concept. The question is therefore what types
of cost increase trigger a fairness claim supporting the seller's at-
tempt to pass-on (at least) part of the cost increase to the buyer?
The central distinction is between actual costs and alternative
costs. An increase in the seller's actual costs is exemplified by an un-
expected rise in factor prices. This type of cost increase will often in-
voke fairness concerns that may assist the seller in extracting a mod-
ification. But, economic costs are not limited to such actual costs.
Economists have long recognized the importance of alternative
costs. The alternative cost of a given action equals the forgone op-
portunities that this action entails. Therefore, the alternative cost of
performance equals the value of the best alternative use the seller has
for the same resources he must devote to performance. In particular,
if a new buyer offers the seller a much higher price for the said per-
formance, this would increase the seller's alternative cost. Empirical
evidence suggests that compared to an increase in actual costs, an in-
crease in the seller's alternative costs will have a much smaller effect
on the seller's ability to extract a modification. Arthur Okun docu-
ments the hostile reaction of customers to price increases triggered
3' See, e.g., Neale and Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation at 158
(cited in note 31) ("[Flairness is not an objective state. Rather, a social environment is
cognitively transformed, and a state of (un)fairness is perceived"); Linda Babcock et al.,
Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 Amer Econ Rev 1337 (1995); Linda
Babcock and George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, 11 J Econ Persp 109 (1997); Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Ne-
gotiation, 345 (Harvard, 1985) ("you want your just share, and what you think is a "just
share" may not agree with your adversaries' assessments").
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by excess demand, as opposed to price increases induced by increased
actual costs. 39 Kahneman et al. presented subjects with a hypotheti-
cal concerning a hardware store that raises the price of snow shovels
after a large snowstorm. Eighty two percent of the subjects consid-
ered such a price increase, driven by access demand, namely, by the
increase in alternative costs, to be unfair. A similar price increase
driven by a rise in the wholesale price of shovels would not have gar-
nered such hostile reactions.
40
To ascertain the effect of fairness on credibility, we focus on the
seller's perspective. We identify three considerations that may affect
the seller's perception of a fair outcome at the modification stage: (1)
equal division of the actual ex post surplus; (2) sharing the burden of
an unexpected cost increase, and (3) guaranteeing the ex ante division
of surplus.4
1
1. The Equal Split
The first consideration that may affect the seller's concept of fairness
relies on a notion of ex-post equality. According to this notion, fair-
ness requires an equal division of the actual surplus between the two
parties. If the cost of performance turns out to be C, the contract price
should be increased to 1/2(v + C) in order to achieve a fair allocation.
The fair outcome, from the seller's perspective, is defined by the fair
price 1/2(v + C).
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the equal split is
considered by many to be the fair outcome. 42 The equal split no-
tion of fairness is by no means unique to the modification context.
It is prevalent in general bargaining problems. As Gibbard puts it,
individuals "latch onto symmetries, favoring equal division or
39 See Okun, Prices and Quantities at 170 (cited in note 32).
40 See Kahneman et al, 76 Amer Econ Rev at 729, 732-734 (cited in note 31).
11 A fourth consideration may place greater weight on the original contract, arguing
that the parties' initial agreement must be honored regardless of any changed circum-
stances. However, this concept of fairness will most likely be adopted by the buyer, and
not by the seller. See the sources cited in note 38 of this article for a discussion of the
subjectivity and self-serving nature of fairness concerns. Moreover, such a concept of
fairness, if adopted by the seller, will not bolster the credibility of the threat to breach.42 See, e.g., Jack Ochs, and Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bar-
gaining, 79 Amer Econ Rev 335 (1989); Guth, 3 J Econ Behav & Org 367 (cited in note
35); Kahneman et al, 59 J Bus 285 (cited in note 31). Robert Frank has proposed the fol-
lowing definition of a fair transaction: 'A fair transaction is one in which the surplus
is divided (approximately) equally The transaction becomes increasingly unfair as the
division increasingly deviates from equality" Frank, Passions Within Reason at 165
(cited in note 1). It has also been argued that the fifty-fifty split is the evolutionary
stable convention in bargaining. See H. P. Young, An Evolutionary Model of Bargain-
ing, 59 J Econ Theory 145, 145-168.
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proportionality," and this judgment is "deeply ingrained by early
acculturation.
' 43
In particular, this notion of fairness would arguably affect also the
first stage bargaining between the seller and the buyer. At this first
stage, when both parties believe that the seller's cost of performance
is c, the equal split norm advocates a contract price of 1/2(v + c). Ob-
viously, this does not mean that the original contract price will always
be 1/2(v + c). Disparate bargaining power and other factors also play
an important role in determining the stage 1 price. It does mean, how-
ever, that other thing equal, a deviation from this benchmark of equal-
ity reduces the willingness of a party to enter into the deal. Likewise,
at the renegotiation stage, a deviation from the adjusted benchmark
of equality will affect the willingness of a party to remain in the deal.
It should be noted that the existence of an original agreement be-
tween the parties, which often deviates from the equal split notion,
suggests that pecuniary interests might override parties' fairness con-
cerns. It may well be, however, that the intensity of the fairness sen-
timents under the original contract-the deviation of the original
price from the benchmark of 1/2(v + c)-is sufficiently increased un-
der the new circumstances, once the original price is compared to the
revised equal-split benchmark of 1/2(v + C), to override the rational
pecuniary calculus. The framework for formalizing the intensity of
fairness concerns will be developed in Section C below.
2. Sharing Unexpected Burdens
The second consideration that may affect the seller's concept of fair-
ness also relies on a notion of equality or sharing, but to a lesser de-
gree. According to this sharing notion, fairness does not require an
equal split of the overall surplus, but only of the unanticipated in-
crease in the seller's cost of performance. By assumption the seller
was not responsible for this change of circumstances, and thus should
not bear the burden alone. In contrast to the equal split consideration,
the sharing principle applies only where the original contract is silent,
namely it applies only to the unanticipated cost increase, and not to
the overall surplus.
Charles Fried in his seminal book, Contract as Promise, advo-
cates this sharing approach with respect to what he calls "contrac-
tual accidents. ' 44 A "contractual accident" occurs when an unan-
43 Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (cited in note 37).
44 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 69-73 (Harvard, 1981). Fried focuses on excuse
cases (mistake, frustration of purpose, impossibility and impracticability), but the logic
of his argument applies to the modification context as well.
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ticipated contingency arises on which agreement is absent. In such
cases-
there may be no basis for holding the parties responsible or ac-
countable to one another. Rather, persons in some relation, per-
haps engaged in some common enterprise, suffer an unexpected
loss.... The sharing principle comes into play where no agree-
ment obtains, [and] no one in the relationship is at fault....
Sharing applies where there are no rights to respect .... It is pe-
culiarly appropriate to filling the gaps in agreements, to picking
up after contractual accidents.4
5
While Fried advocates a normative principle, it is based on intu-
itive notions of justice that may often motivate individuals, and to
that extent it would have a positive, or descriptive, validity. Accord-
ingly, if an anticipated increase in the seller's cost from c to C is
viewed as a contractual accident, the sharing principle will be trig-
gered. According to the sharing principle, the loss of (C - c) should be
split between the parties such that each party should bear 1/2(C - c).
Therefore, the contract price should be increased by 1/2(C - c).
3. Guaranteeing the Ex Ante Division of Surplus
The third consideration that may affect the seller's perception of a fair
outcome places greater weight on the ex ante division of surplus as
determined by the original contract price. Specifically, if the stage 1
price is p, then the original contract allotted a fraction (p - c)/(v - c)
of the surplus to the seller and a fraction (v - p)/(v - c) of the surplus
to the buyer. Fairness requires respect for this ex ante division. This
division was the true product of the parties' mutual assent. That is,
under this view what the parties fundamentally agree upon when
they enter a contract is a certain division of the surplus: what is the
relative fraction that each gets. They dress this agreement in a set of
ad-hoc terms, but only because these terms achieve the intended
split. Accordingly, when circumstances change, the basic agreement
concerning the division of surplus should be maintained, and the
terms of the agreement should be adjusted.
When the seller experiences an unexpected cost increase, this al-
ters (specifically, reduces) the magnitude of the surplus. According to
the seller's fairness perception, these changed circumstances should
not affect the agreed upon division of the (new) surplus. Therefore, if
the seller is to receive a fraction (p - c)/(v - c) of the actual surplus, the
41 Id. at 70-71.
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modified contract price should satisfy: (P - C)/(v - C) = (p - c)/(v - c),
or P = C + (v - C) (p - c)/(v - c), implying P > p.
The notion that the fair price at the modification stage depends on
the original transaction relates to the empirical findings regarding
the strong influence of the "reference transaction" on people's con-
ception of fairness. 4 6 Moreover, these findings suggest that exogenous
shocks, leading to an increase in the cost of performance, justify an
increased price that maintains the "reference profit.11
7
4. The Three Concepts of Fairness Compared
We have presented three distinct concepts of fairness that may influ-
ence the seller's behavior in the modification stage. Before proceed-
ing further, it is useful to compare these three concepts and identify
the relationships between them.
Consider the following example. Assume that c = 0, v = 100 and
C = 60. According to the equal split (ES) concept the fair price should
now be pIS = 1/2(100 + 60) = 80. According to the sharing of burdens
(SB) concept, the fair price should be pSB = p + 1/2(60 - 0) = p + 30. And,
according to the ex ante division of surplus (ED) concept, the fair
price should be pED = 60 + (100 - 60) • (p - 0)/(100 - 0) = 60 + 0.4. p.
Using the preceding example, we can now state the relationship
between the three fairness concepts.
Claim:
(i) When the original contract price, p, implements an equal
split of the ex ante surplus, v - c, all three fairness concepts
imply the same modification, i.e. PES = pSB = pED. In the ex-
ample, p = 1/2(100 - 0) = 50 implies pIS = pSB = pED = 80.
(ii) When the original contract price, p, allocates a larger share
of the ex ante surplus, v - c, to the seller, pES < pED < pSB. For
instance, in the example, if p = 55, then pIS = 80, pSB = 55 + 30
= 85 and PED = 60 + 0.4 55 = 82.
(iii) When the original contract price, p, allocates a larger share
of the ex ante surplus, v - c, to the buyer, psB < paD < PS. For
instance, in the example, if p = 45, then pES = 80, pSB = 45 + 30
= 75 and pED = 60 + 0.4 -45 = 78.48
46 See Kahneman et al, 76 Amer Econ Rev 728 (cited in note 31). "When the refer-
ence profit of a firm is threatened, however, it may set new terms that protect its profit
at the transactor's expense." Id. at 730.
47 Id. at 731-732.
11 More generally, recall that pES = 1/2(v + C), PsB =p + 1/2(C - c) and pED = C + (v -
C). (p - c)/(v - c), and note that p = 1/2(v + c) implies an equal division of the ex ante
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The relative importance of the three fairness concepts can affect
the credibility of the seller's threat to breach. When fairness requires
a more substantial modification of the original contract, namely a
larger increase of the contract price, the credibility-bolstering effect
of fairness will likely be greater. Therefore, if the original contract
price, p, allocates a larger share of the ex ante surplus, v - c, to the
seller, the SB concept of fairness will provide most credibility, the ED
concept will provide less credibility and the ES concept will provide
least credibility. Conversely, if the original contract price, p, allocates
a larger share of the ex ante surplus, v - c, to the buyer, the ES con-
cept of fairness will provide most credibility, the ED concept will pro-
vide less credibility and the SB concept will provide least credibility.
Finally, if the original contract price, p, implements an equal split of
the ex ante surplus, v - c, all three fairness concepts will have the
same effect on the credibility of the seller's threat to breach.
After discussing the possible concepts of a fair outcome, we now
turn to analyze the influence of fairness concerns on the seller's bar-
gaining behavior at the modification stage. For this purpose, we do
not distinguish between the three fairness concepts and the three
"fair" prices implied by them, pES, pSB and pEo, and rather refer to a
generic fair price P1.
C. "Unfairness Costs" and Credibility
49
Acknowledging the potentially important impact of fairness con-
cerns does not mean that the seller will invariably insist on the fair
outcome (specifically, on the fair price pF). Even when a seller cares
about fairness, he will generally still care about his material payoffs
as well. Thus, behavior will be the result of a balance between a
party's material interests and his fairness concerns. Such a balance
requires the definition of a measure of unfairness and a quantifica-
tion of the cost of unfairness.
In the present context, fairness is not an all-or-nothing concept.
For instance, if the fair price is pF = 100, an actual price of 90 will be
considered more fair, and an actual price of 50 will be considered less
fair. For simplicity, let PF - P measure the degree of unfairness of the
price P. Accordingly, we can say that a seller, who performs in ex-
surplus. Hence, the results stated in the claim can be derived as follows. Comparing
pEs and psB, it can be readily shown that pES > pSB if and only if p < 1/2(v + c). Compar-
ing pEs and pED, it can be readily shown that p > pEP if and only ifp < 1/2(v + c). And,
comparing psB and pED, it can be readily shown that pED > psB if and only if p < 1/2(v + c).
49 This sub-section borrows from Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and
Preferences, mimeo, Harvard Law School (2002).
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change for a price P bears a fairness cost of a [p - P], where a E [0, cc)
represents the level of the seller's fairness concern. 0, 5
As noted above, the seller will balance material interests with fair-
ness concerns to determine his bargaining behavior.5 2 In particular,
the balance of these two considerations will determine the seller's
reservation price at the renegotiation stage:
1 G[C - p - Ds] + - .[p _ p].S1+0 [ p + Y
Consider first a seller with no fairness concerns, i.e. a = 0, who is
guided by material interests alone. At the renegotiation stage, when-
ever C - p < Ds this seller will have a zero reservation price and there
will be no modification. At the other extreme, a seller with very
strong fairness concerns, i.e. a -> -, will insist on the fair price, and
his reservation price would be Aps = pF - p.
Between these two extremes, a stronger fairness concern increases
50 Generally, our account of fairness assumes that an individual wishes to be treated
fairly and suffers if he is not treated fairly. This "individualistic" account of fairness is
supported by empirical findings. Neale and Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in
Negotiation at 163-64 (cited in note 31) (advantageous inequity is preferred over disad-
vantageous inequity); Ochs and Roth, 79 Amer Econ Rev 335 (cited in note 42); see also
Huck and Oechssler, 28 Games & Econ Behav 13 (cited in note 34); Gary E. Bolton, A
Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence, 81 Amer Econ Rev 1096,
1110(1991).
1' The a parameter can also represent the intensity of the emotional response to an
unfair deal. As Robert Frank notes: "[sitandards evoke an emotional response," and
specifically breach of fairness standards can trigger emotions in the modification con-
text. Frank, Passions Within Reason at 157 (cited in note 1). More generally, Frank ob-
serves that "[t~he rationalists speak of tastes, not emotions, but for analytical pur-
poses, the two play exactly parallel roles. Thus, for example, a person who is motivated
to avoid the emotion of guilt may be equivalently described as someone with a "taste"
for honest behavior." Id. at 15. Emotions and "tastes" (i.e. preferences for fairness) are
often used interchangeably in these contexts. See, e.g., Rabin, 83 Amer Econ Rev 1281
(cited in note 34); Jack Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and
Promises, in J. Dupre, ed, The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimal-
ity322 (MIT, 1987).
52 Our formulation of the "unfairness cost" relates to the following observation by
Robert Frank: 'A behavioral predisposition, in economic terms, is thus much like a tax
on not behaving in a particular way" Frank, Passions Within Reason at 6-7 (cited in
note 1).
s3 The seller's reservation price is formally derived as follows. If a price increase of
Ap is agreed upon, the seller's utility from performing the modified contract is given by
Us = y, + p + Ap - C - a . [p' - (p + Ap)], where y, is the seller's income. On the other
hand, if the seller breaches the contract, his utility will be: Us = ys - Ds. Comparing the
seller's performance utility and breach utility, we can derive the seller's reservation
price at the renegotiation stage. (The expression for the seller's reservation price pro-
vided in the text assumes PF > p + Ap.)
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the seller's reservation price, Aps/Do > 0. In particular, there exists a
threshold value 5 = D, - C + p/PF - p, such that sellers with weaker
fairness concerns, a < 6, will not have a credible threat to breach (i.e.
their reservation price will be zero), and seller's with stronger fairness
concerns, a > 6, will have a credible threat to breach (i.e. their reser-
vation price will be positive).
A seller's preference for fairness transforms empty words into a
credible threat to breach.5 4 In his book, Passions within Reason: The
Strategic Role of the Emotions, Robert Frank notes:
a person who is known to "dislike" an unfair bargain can credi-
bly threaten to walk away from one, even when it is in her nar-
row interest to accept it. By virtue of being known to have this
preference she becomes a more effective negotiator.55
V. IRRATIONALITY IN MODIFICATION
DOCTRINE-CASE DISCUSSION
Recognizing the credibility of "irrational" threats can shed different
light on some of the prominent cases in the law of contract modifi-
cation. These are cases in which courts decided not to enforce the
modification agreement, decisions that most commentators and sub-
sequent courts have endorsed. The analysis in this paper suggests
that non-enforcement may have been an undesirable result.
Consider, first, the classic casebook favorite Alaska Packers v.
Domenico.5 6 A group of seamen aboard a fishing vessel, hired under
a contract that entitled them to a wage of $50 for the season and 2¢
for each fish they caught, went on strike soon after the season had be-
-4 Compare to Schelling's description of the power of principles: A threat based on
a "principle" is more powerful/credible. In the modification context, the seller's
threat, when based on fairness principles, gains credibility See Thomas C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict 34 (Harvard, 1960).
11 Frank, Passions Within Reason at 5 (cited in note 1). For this reason preferences
for fairness can be expected to evolve endogenously. See, e.g., Huck and Oechssler, 28
Games & Econ Behav 13 (cited in note 34); Bar-Gill and Fershtman, Law and Prefer-
ences (cited in note 49). As noted by Jack Hirshleifer: "The economist must go beyond
the assumption of "economic man" precisely because of the economic advantage of
not behaving like economic man-an advantage that presumably explains why the
world is not populated solely by economic men." Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as
Guarantors of Threats and Promises (cited in note 51). Some of those opposed to the
view that emotions can serve as commitment devices agree nevertheless that emo-
tions, which are "hardwired" to preserve norms of cooperation, may occasionally be
invoked outside their rational realm. See, e.g., Binmore, Game Theory and the Social
Contract (cited in note 6).
56 117 F 99 (9th Cir 1902).
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gun, demanding a wage increase. Unable to find substitute workers,
and expecting large losses if work did not resume (such that could not
be recovered from the judgment-proof seamen), their employer agreed
to modify the contract and increase the fixed component of the wage
to $100. At the end of the season, after the seamen completed their
obligations satisfactorily, the employer refused to pay the modified
wage. The seamen sued to recover this increment.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Admi-
ralty and decided not to enforce the modification. It explained that
the employer's consent to the wage increase was coerced, being ex-
tracted at a time in which he was most vulnerable, having no ade-
quate remedies or substitutes. Indeed, contract law commentary in
the hundred years since has branded this case as the prototype gun-
to-the-head case, suggesting that the seamen timed their threat op-
portunistically so as to maximize the employer's vulnerability.5 7 The
result seems logical and desirable."
The decision in Domenico was reached under the duress principle.
Would a different result be mandated had the court utilized the cred-
ibility principle? While the analysis would have to focus on the in-
centives of the threatening employees rather than on the perspective
of the threatened employer, it has been suggested that the result
would not change. Under the view that the seamen's threat was strictly
opportunistic, it is clear that they would not have carried it out. Had
the employer rejected their demand, they would have been better off
returning to work than breaching the contract and losing the entire
seasons worth of wages. Accordingly, the reluctance of the law to en-
force the modification provides the desirable effect of deterring sim-
ilarly situated parties from making their non-credible hold-up threats
in the first place.
59
But a different account has also been suggested. In their complaint,
the seamen argued that their modification demand came as a result
of their realization that the fishing equipment was in poor shape,
thereby reducing the expected volume of the catch and their corre-
sponding per-catch compensation. In fact, a careful study of the cir-
-1 See, e.g., Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts at 70
(cited in note 14).
58 Richard A. Posner, Economics Analysis of Law 110 (Aspen Law & Business, 5th
ed 1997) ("This is the correct economic result.").
59 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J Legal Stud
411 (1977) ('Alaska Packers is "a clear case of where the motive for the modification
was simply to exploit a monopoly position conferred on the [fishermen] by the cir-
cumstances of the contract); Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of
Contracts at 70, 72 (cited in note 14).
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cumstances of this case shows that the seamen had many reasons to
be upset.60 For one, the entire fixed component of their wage ($50) was
deducted as a "recruitment fee." Being dependent solely on the per-
fish bonus, they realized, as they arrived in Alaska, that more em-
ployees than they anticipated would share these bonuses, reducing
their income. In fact, the 82 seamen who were part of the strike were
all new to this particular cannery, and they discovered that the vet-
eran fishermen-all of different ethnic background-were earning
higher salaries for equivalent tasks. Further, while there was genuine
dispute whether the recycled fishing nets supplied to the seamen
were of inferior quality, it is quite clear that the seamen genuinely
thought they were, and had difficulty utilizing those nets effectively.
Thus, learning that their overall income would be less than antici-
pated, due to what they perceived as the fault of their employer, and re-
alizing that they were treated less favorably than their co-employees,
the seamen may have come to regard the terms of their contract as
unfair. From this perspective, it might well be that the seamen were
willing to forgo whatever remaining wage they would earn, in order
to avoid what they considered an exploitative and unfair compensa-
tion, one that falls short of what they initially expected to get and
what others get for identical effort.
In its decision, the trial court rejected offhand this possible moti-
vation. It held that the seamen's claim that the equipment was defec-
tive is "highly improbable," but it did so solely on the "self-evident"
grounds that it was against the employer's interest to provide equip-
ment that would diminish his own profits. 61 The trial court never-
theless decided to enforce the modified contract, reasoning that the
modification was necessary to avoid the even less desirable result for
the employer, of uncompensated breach. Apparently, the trial court
too was under the impression that but for the modification the sea-
men would have remained on strike. In other words, the court con-
sidered the seamen's threat, although irrational, credible. 62 On the
60 Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers v. Domenico, 2000 Utah L Rev
185 (2000).
61 Domenico v. Alaska Packers, 112 F 554, 556 (9th 1901). Under Threedy's account,
however, the seamen's claim appears more plausible. In that particular season, due to
the abundance of salmon, the employer's interest may well have been to limit the vol-
ume of the catch, as it already exceeded the capacity of the cannery. The seamen were
needed primarily as sailors, not fishermen. Threedy, 2000 Utah L Rev at 209-212 (cited
in note 60).
62 Domenico, 112 F at 559 stating:
The reason why the defendant did not choose to rely upon the original agree-
ment, and bring an action for the damages occasioned by its breach, may have
been, and probably was, because of the inability of the libellants to respond in
damages. Under such circumstances it would be strange, indeed, if the law
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basis of the underlying circumstances, and recognizing the seamen's
state of mind, this impression is quite plausible.
Another illustration of the implications of fairness concerns on
the credibility of the threat to breach is the famous case of Lingen-
felder v. Wainwright Brewery Co. 63 In that case, an architect who was
hired to oversee the construction of a brewery threatened to cease
work unless his fee was increased. Here, unlike the typical modifica-
tion of a construction contract, the reason for the demand was not an
unexpected increase in the actual cost of performance, but rather the
architect's disappointment from not being awarded the second and
highly profitable phase of the project: installation of the refrigeration
plant in the brewery. The court, in accordance with the consideration
doctrine that governed the problem of modification at the time, held
that no new consideration was provided by the architect to justify his
increased pay: "under the new promise, he was not to do any more or
anything different. ' 64 The court highlighted the coercion under which
the brewery's acquiescence was extracted, given the loss of time and
money that would be involved in finding a replacement.
While this case appears as another prototype hold-up example,
where the threat to breach is opportunistic and non-credible, a care-
ful reading may suggest otherwise. The referee who adjudicated the
case and who ruled against the architect found that when the archi-
tect learned that one of his competitors was picked for the profitable
refrigeration project, "he felt disappointed, aggrieved, angry." Indeed,
we are told that the threat to breach was not mere words; immedi-
ately after being notified of the brewery's decision to pass him over,
the architect "took away his plans, called off his superintendent on
the ground, and notified Mr. Wainwright that he would have nothing
more to do with the brewery."65 This action was not a strategic display
of false emotions, a bluff. The testimony offered in this case suggests
that for a period of two months, the architect refused to return to the
site, did not respond to daily telephone and mail communications,
and eventually returned only upon the intervention of an intermedi-
ary-his close friend Adolphus Busch. 66 It appears that the architect
made significant efforts to secure the refrigeration project. In terms
would not permit the defendant to ... enter into [a] contract mutually benefi-
cial to all the parties thereto, in that it gave to the libellants reasonable com-
pensation for their labor, and enabled the defendant to employ to advantage the
large capital it had invested in its canning and fishing plant.
63 15 SW 844 (Mo 1891).
64 Id. at 848.
61 Id. at 846.
66 Transcript of testimony of Ellis Wainwright, Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery
at 158-59 (unpublished, St. Louis Cir Ct, October Term 1885).
168 Threatening an "Irrational" Breach of Contract
of the analysis above, the architect's profit declined unexpectedly
when he was overlooked for the second phase of the project. He
deemed this to be unfair, and was willing to forgo the small profit un-
der the original agreement in order to avoid working for a client that
treated him in this manner.
We can only speculate whether the threats in Domenico and in
Lingenfelder were credible. Accordingly, it would be an overstate-
ment to suggest that the decisions in these cases were wrong. Recog-
nizing the role of fairness motivations, our analysis of these cases
yields at least a tentative claim: to the extent that the threats were
motivated by an emotional reaction to what the threatening parties
considered an unfair deal, and that this emotional reaction was suffi-
ciently intense to render credible the threats to breach, the decisions
in these cases are detrimental to the interests of the threatened par-
ties. If indeed the threats were credible, the legal restriction on the
ability to extract a modification will only induce the threatening par-
ties, and parties similarly situated, to breach the contract.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the analysis in this paper is
normative. It addresses the question-'when should modifications
be enforced?' It is not a positive analysis, for it does not suggest that
case decisions conform to the enforcement principle developed here.
In fact, the two leading cases examined above, as well as our com-
panion study of contract modifications, 6 7 convinced us that courts
more often than not overlook the credibility condition. Nevertheless,
modification doctrine can be interpreted to incorporate the type of
fairness motivations studied here. For example, Section 89 of the Re-
statement provides that a modification should be binding if it is "fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties
when the contract was made." While the current application of the
"fair and equitable" requirement has not been linked to the credibil-
ity of the threat to breach, Section 89 could be interpreted to support
such a link. That is, when the fairness concerns rise to the magnitude
that would induce the threatening party to breach the unmodified
contract, the modification ought to be enforceable. A similar reinter-
pretation could be proposed for the "good faith" requirement in
U.C.C. §2-209.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether a threat to breach is rendered credible as a result of the fair-
ness and emotional motivations of the kind identified in this paper
67 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, The Credibility of Threats to Breach at Part V (cited in
note 5).
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might be a difficult determination to make. It requires the decision
maker to trace the emotions and the state of mind of the threatening
party, not merely his objectively verifiable pecuniary interests. These
are variables that do not lend themselves to straightforward quantifi-
cation and comparison, thus it is not always clear whether they exist,
and-if they exist-whether they are sufficiently intense to over-
come the rational, strictly pecuniary, calculus. Moreover, in light of
the difficulty in verifying the authenticity of such behavioral reac-
tions, parties might be tempted to bluff, to appear angrier and more
insulted than they really are, and thus convince their counterparts
(and courts) that their threats are credible. As Robert Frank recog-
nized, there may be a strategic advantage to an emotional facade.
68
Further, as with many emotional responses, what initially, at the time
of the threat, may well have been an authentic display of a fairness-
based sentiment, may subside over time. In particular, when the time
comes to carry out the threat, the irrational considerations that sup-
ported it at the outset may diminish. That is, the credibility charac-
teristic of the threat may wear away.
Indeed, it would be plausible to conclude that fairness-based con-
cerns cannot provide a threat with the same dependable and verifi-
able basis of credibility as "hard" pecuniary concerns. It is tempting,
then, to ignore this set of motivations in designing legal policy. But
the fact that transactors' fairness considerations are difficult to ver-
ify does not mean that they are non-existent. Ignoring them will not
make them go away. To the extent that these motivations neverthe-
less exist, failing to account for them may give rise to undesirable le-
gal policy. The fact that transactors do not have a rational basis for
their threat to breach does not mean that they also do not have an ir-
rational basis for their threat.
Hence, the conclusion this paper proposes is tentative: if it is evi-
dent that a threat to breach a contract was motivated by an irrational
yet credible drive, the resulting modification ought to be enforceable.
Failure of the law to enforce the modification will not serve to uproot
such irrational conduct.69 It will merely hamper the ability of the
68 Frank, Passions Within Reason (cited in note 1). Frank also notes the problem of
mimicry, where a party might pretend to have credibility enhancing emotions or fair-
ness concerns. Frank argues, however, that genuine emotions and fairness concerns of-
ten have observable symptoms such as involuntary body language. Therefore, for in-
stance, it is easier for a truly angry person to appear angry. Id. at 9-12. But see Binmore,
Game Theory and the Social Contract at 339-40 (cited in note 6).
69 It should be noted, as a theoretical possibility, that failure of the law to enforce
modifications that result from fairness-driven threats might reduce the prevalence of
such fairness motivations. A transactor's sense of unfairness can be reinforced under a
regime that gives recognition to such sentiments, and-conversely-can be mitigated
under a regime that denies their existence.
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threatened party to commit to a modification, confining her to the
less desirable outcome of breach.
As with any tentative conclusion, its importance depends on the
empirical validity of the underlying premise. It remains for future
work to explore, both experimentally and by case analysis, the extent
to which threats to breach are motivated by "irrational," fairness-
oriented, concerns.
